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R&D has played a central role in Norwegian public industrial policy for only a relatively 
short period. Before 1963, there was little interest in linking technological research policy 
to a wider national industrial strategy. During the mid 1960s, attempts were made to link 
public research more closely to industrial development, and the state became more 
engaged in funding industrial R&D. During the 1980s, governments increased public 
industrial R&D funding substantially, and for a short period of time research became a 
core element in national industrial policy. However, from the early 1990s the situation 
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Introduction 
R&D has played a central role in Norwegian public industrial policy for only a relatively 
short period. Before 1963, there was little interest in linking technological research policy 
to a wider national industrial strategy. During the mid 1960s, attempts were made to link 
public research more closely to industrial development, and the state became more 
engaged in funding industrial R&D. During the 1980s, governments increased public 
industrial R&D funding substantially, and for a short period of time research became a 
core element in national industrial policy. However, from the early 1990s the situation 
again changed. Public research policy lost its significance in wider national industrial 
strategies. 
 
What happened between mid 1960s and 1990 to create a wider interest in research as part 
of industrial policy making? This paper argues that the rise of support for publicly funded 
R&D as part of industrial policy was closely linked to the emergence of new 
technologies, and to an ideology that linked future industrialisation (and welfare) to the 
emerging technologies. From the 1960s electronics, computers, telecommunication, 
control technologies, etc. were seen as important knowledge bases both for modernisation 
of older sectors of society and for development of new industrial sectors. As much of the 
technological development in the new industries was based on R&D, the industries were 
defined as “research-based” or “research-driven” industries. By the 1980s, there were 
many examples of rapidly growing companies of this type, and there was a wide 
acceptance that research-driven industrialisation was crucial for future industrialisation 
and welfare.   2
The ideology of research driven industrialisation was promoted from the 1960s by a 
small group of people closely linked to the Labour party, technological research, and the 
defense sector. This small group of people – the modernisers - succeeded in becoming 
influential in political decision-making in a number of areas, and supported the creation 
of public institutions for research-driven industrial expansion during the 1960s. (Wicken 
1994) The support systems were strengthened during the 1980s as the ideology got a 
hegemonic position in the discourse on industrial policy. At this time, there was a broad 
political consensus on the importance of this type of industrial strategy, which had 
publicly funded R&D as a core element. 
 
This development may be seen as a specific strategy for creation of a R&D-intensive 
network-based type of industrialisation. (see Wicken 2007) The long term intention of the 
group of modernisers was to create a new type of industrial development that was 
independent of natural resources. They represented a political attempt to make Norway’s 
industry more modern and strengthen what believed to be future growth sectors, and 
public R&D policy became a central part of this strategy. A number of public institutions 
that supported this type of industry were established during 1965-1990 and the outcome 
was a public R&D policy system with specific characteristics. 
 
R&D enters industrial policy 
The new interest in R&D for industrial development that emerged during the 1960s  was 
linked to the wider politics of technology during the Cold War. The Sputnik shock from 
October 1957 may be seen as a turning point . The Soviet Union was able to put a   3
satellite into orbit and was believed to have inter-continental ballistic missiles that could 
reach America. Sputnik was interpreted as a challenge to the military superiority of the 
West. The reaction from the American government and later by Western European 
governments was a large scale investment in public research and education, and the 
elevation of issues related to science, technology and knowledge to central positions in 
political debate. The US rapidly increased defence R&D and soon entered into a race 
with the Soviet Union that focused on space technologies.  
 
A rethinking of national science and technology priorities took place in Norway’s close 
ally, Great Britain, during the early 1960s. In 1963, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
gave the famous speech on the ‘White Heat’,
1 and this was linked to a wider discussion in 
British media on “Linking science with industrial growth”.
2 The discussion in Britain was 
closely linked to developments in the OECD where the Science and Technology 
Department introduced a prescription for how OECD countries should achieve the overall 
objective of the 1960s: increase GNP by 50 per cent. The OECD suggested that all 
countries should introduce a science policy directed towards industrial development.
3 The 
OECD became a driving force for the establishment of industrial science policies, both 
through national reports and also by a series of reports on the ‘technology gap’ between 
America and Europe throughout the 1960s. Maybe most important was the construction 
of the concept ‘Research and Development’ – R&D - by an OECD committee in 1963, a 
concept introduced as an instrument to promote ‘R&D policies’ in Western economies. 
(OECD 1963) 
   4
These developments within the USA, UK and the OECD strongly influenced the 
emergence of a strategy that incorporated R&D into industrial policy. The discussion in 
Britain during 1963 sparked an internal debate within the Norwegian Ministry of Industry 
on how to organise and regulate public R&D for industry.
4 The OECD’s 1963 assessment 
of the situation in Norway also influenced the policy development.
5   
 
Research had, of course, been a part of Norwegian industrial activities and also part of 
Norwegian industrial policy before the 1960s. Research had for a long time been 
incorporated in small-scale decentralised resource-based production in Norway (see  
Wicken 2007 for more discussion). The state established a public research infrastructure 
for both fishing and agriculture in the 19
th century, and this infrastructure has since 
increased in size. The establishment of collective industrial research institutes during the 
20
th century also contributed to the establishment of a public knowledge infrastructure for 
this type of industrialisation. Some publicly funded R&D also supported innovation in 
the large- scale centralised form of industrialisation. Both the Technical University 
(NTH) and research institutes like SI, IFA, CMI and Sintef collaborated with laboratories 
and management in many of the large scale process industry companies. However, 
research did not play a strategic part in policymaking for these industries during the 
1950s. Research was seen a ‘servant’, subordinated to those in control of the production, 
and not a strategic factor that influenced future investments and policy decisions. This 
was particularly the case in politically important process industries during the 1950s, 
when research was linked to incremental improvement in efficiency in existing processes,   5
rather than being viewed as a form of investment that might transform the industrial and 
economic structure of Norway.  
 
In the 1960s there was a renewed interest in establishing improved R&D support systems 
for both the small-scale and large-scale Norwegian industrial sectors. To support the 
small-scale decentralised form of industry, a new financial fund for collective industrial 
research (Bransjeforskningsfondet) was established in 1967, and during the 1980s a 
number of institutions for promoting diffusion of new technologies among small 
companies were introduced. The support system for the large-scale centralised form of 
industry became more complex, and involved changes in education and university 
research that were linked to demands from the emerging oil sector during the 1970s.  
 
The ideology linked to how R&D could contribute to the older parts of industrialization 
did not change radically during the 1960s. Some new institutions were established to 
support research in large-scale companies, and funding of the public research 
infrastructure for small-scale industries and mechanisms for the diffusion of new 
technologies, also increased. But the more radical change in the public industrial R&D 
policy was the emergence of the idea of ‘research driven industrialisation’ based on 
emerging technologies of the 1960s. It was the emergence of the R&D-intensive network-
based industry that made R&D a core aspect of industrial policy. R&D became a driving 
force for a new type of development, and a number of new institutions were established 
to promote the emerging technologies and the new type of industry. 
   6
In the following sections we look more closely at the development of industrial R&D 
policies for the three main industrial layers in the national innovation system (Wicken 
2007) that emerged in the mid-1960s. Between 1963 and 1967, Norwegian governments 
established a number of institutions to support R&D in companies, and increased public 
R&D funding. Within this short period of time the technical-industrial research council 
(NTNF) was reorganised and new institutions for distribution of funding to companies 
introduced.  The Development Fund for industrial policy was established in 1965, the 
Fund for Collective Industrial Research was established in 1967, and a subsidy system for 
public R&D contracts was introduced in 1967.   
  
Marginal innovations: R&D in large scale centralised industrialization 
R&D played a marginal role in the Norwegian industrial policy for large-scale centralized 
industrialisation that was introduced after the end of WWII. The main industrial strategy 
was to transform the traditional industrial structure dominated by SMEs (small-scale 
decentralised industrialisation) into a more modern structure characterized by large scale 
and capital intensive corporations (large-scale centralised industrialisation). The Ministry 
of Industry was established in 1947, and the first Minister of Industry, Erik Brofoss, was 
the architect of the large-scale industrialisation policy. Brofoss remained the leading 
industrial strategist in Labour until his death in 1972. The policy sought to build up 
strong business organisations, particularly large-scale production units exploiting 
abundant energy resources (cheap electricity) and other natural resources. The Ministry 
of Industry focused its policy on building state-owned companies or attracting 
international investment in areas like metal production (aluminium and steel), energy   7
(electricity and coal), minerals (mining) and fishing (filet industry).  The government 
worked closely with the management of the major state-owned companies, like Norsk 
Hydro and ÅSV (aluminium: see Moen 2007). The emergence of the oil sector in 1970 
reinforced this policy, which focused on capital as the strategic input factor for 
industrialisation, treating R&D as an investment of marginal importance. (Jensen 1989) 
 
A number of proposals to establish new resource-based large-scale industries linked to 
the steel industry, the metals industry, oil refineries, copper mining, and carbide 
production were discussed by governments during and after the 1950s.
6 Some of the 
industrial projects required public R&D investments, as was the case with proposals to 
exploit Spitsbergen’s coal deposits for the production of coke, as well as the proposal to 
establish a steel works in Narvik.
7 In this industrial policy, R&D was an instrument to 
solve problems in production processes. Research was a “servant” that could make large-
scale capital investments in process-intensive industries profitable but was not a driving 
force in industrialisation. Within the Ministry of Industry research policy was 
marginalised, and there was little if any interaction between the Ministry and the research 
council responsible for industrial research. NTNF was left in splendid isolation, and the 
research council was not part of the government’s industrial policy. Still, NTNF 
established close relationships with individuals from various industrial companies who 
served on NTNF’s board and committees. The main proponent for this strategy was the 
director of NTNF during 1946 - 1980, Robert Major. The Ministry of Industry, however, 
regarded the representatives of industry that sought to collaborate with NTNF as an   8
unusual group of industrial managers, interested in science and technological research, 
but not representatives of their companies or industries.
8  
 
Beginning in late 1963, the Ministry of Industry reduced NTNF’s ‘splendid isolation,’ 
seeking to ensure that the research council’s strategy was incorporated into industrial 
policy and linking NTNF more closely to demands from industry.
9  The Ministry opposed 
the build-up of a large research institute sector with NTNF funding, and preferred that 
public resources be directed towards R&D in company laboratories. The Ministry also 
wanted to give companies greater influence over how research programmes were defined 
and how funding was distributed among projects and companies.  
  
To implement this policy, NTNF introduced a system for direct funding of R&D to 
companies in 1965 (PIR, Prosjekter i Industriell Regi). This became an influential part of 
NTNF’s policy until the mid 1970s, and after 1990 was the major public program for 
supporting   industrial R&D. Johan B. Holte, the research director and later the 
administrative director of the country’s largest industrial R&D performer, Norsk Hydro, 
became influential in defining the main NTNF strategy for public R&D policy towards 
large-scale industries. He argued that a small country like Norway lacked resources for 
developing new large-scale processes, and that the necessary technology had to be 
procured from abroad. The role of public R&D funding was to improve production 
marginally through small-scale projects. This was the strategy of Norsk Hydro at the 
time, and this became the policy of NTNF in the process industries. The strategy was 
consistent with the longstanding Ministry of Industry characterization of R&D as a   9
servant or a problem-solver to support the profitability of large-scale investments in 
mature, process-intensive industries. (Andersen and Yttri 1997) 
 
In parallel with the reorganization of NTNF, the Ministry of Industry established an 
alternative organization for funding industrial development projects, the Development 
Fund (Utviklingsfondet), which was  established in 1965. NTNF had suggested that a 
separate organization be created within the council (or that an independent 
commercialization company be established) to ensure that new technologies developed 
by the research institutes were commercialized. NTNF found that existing firms were not 
interested in producing research-based products and technologies, and argued that 
Norway needed this type of organization.
10 This proposal created a strong reaction within 
the Ministry of Industry, which feared that the establishment of a commercialisation 
organisation/company would ensure that researchers and scientists remained in ‘splendid 
isolation’ from the rest of the economy. The ministry wanted an alternative strategy, in 
which politicians and representatives from “core” companies made decisions on public 
industrial R&D strategies. Erik Brofoss became the chair of the Development Fund from 
its inception in 1965, and the director of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
(FFI), Finn Lied, became a board member. Other board members represented politically 
important industries in the resource-based sector, as well as shipbuilding. The 
Development Fund became an organisation for supporting research projects in industrial 
companies as part of a wider industrial strategy. (Sogner 1994)  
   10
The main strategy of the Development Fund was to create ‘a rational industrial structure’ 
for each industry, consistent with the ideology of Ministry of Industry that argued that 
Norway’s industrial development was hampered by a lack of companies with financial 
and managerial strength. The overall strategy was to develop strong economic 
organisations – national champions (Sogner 1994) – in all sectors of the economy, 
transforming small-scale industries to support the large-scale ideal. An example was the 
attempt to transform the politically important ship building industry. The Aker mek. 
Verksted became the national champion,  receiving financial support to become a 
dominant firm in the industry. This strategy included the establishment of corporate   
laboratories as well as collaboration with public research institutes on projects such as 
numerically controlled automation of ship navigation and operations   (Andersen 1986)  
 
The Development fund distributed most of its funding to selected national champions in 
shipbuilding
11, process industries, and electronics. During the 1965 - 1977 period, the 
Development Fund supported projects in 287 companies, of which 24 (8%) firms 
received half of all funding.  
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Diffusion of knowledge: R&D in the small–scale, decentralised industrial 
sector 
A discussed above, the Labour governments of 1945-65 introduced a policy to transform 
Norway’s small-scale industry into a more modern large-scale industrial structure.   11
Labour’s industrial policy of the 1950s provided minimal support for the small scale 
decentralised path of industrialization, a posture that was reflected in its R&D initiatives 
of the 1960s. The non-socialist political parties had opposed this policy during the 1950s, 
although the Conservative party became more supportive of Labour’s philosophy on 
industrial development during the 1960s.  
 
Nevertheless, a substantial infrastructure of research institutes designed to support 
individual industries was established after 1950. At the technical university (NTH), the 
research council (NTNF), and at the industry level, initiatives were taken to establish 
laboratories for research directed towards industries in which company-funded R&D was 
non-existent or marginal.  These included construction
12, shipping and shipbuilding,
13 
and electricity production.
14 NTNF also supported research projects organised by 
industrial associations for industries with low R&D intensities, and conducted analyses of 
R&D strategy in individual industries, such as textiles and clothing. (NOU 1971) 
 
In 1965, a non-socialist government consisting of four parties entered government, 
promoting a more positive attitude to small-scale industrialisation. The government 
introduced a policy for R&D support for this type of industries. Since the inter-war 
period, some industries had established collective or collaborative laboratories to solve 
industry-wide problems. Most of these labs were financed by specific taxes that the 
Storting had introduced (export tax, etc.). The early labs of this type were canning and 
paper industries, and during the post-WWII period additional collective labs were 
established at the initiative of companies or industrial associations. The new government   12
introduced a specific funding system (Bransjeforskningsrådet, Collective Industrial 
Research Council) to support collective industrial research for industries with limited in-
house R&D. The classic collective research laboratories focused on problems and 
challenges that were common to all or many of the companies in the industry, and 
normally avoided projects that favoured one company at the expense of a competitor in 
the same industry.  
 
By contrast, the industrial institutes controlled by NTNF or linked to NTH were to a 
larger extent consultancy companies that undertook contract work to solve problems of 
individual companies. Many of them became part of Norway’s knowledge-intensive 
business services sector. Examples of these organizations include Norges Geotekniske 
Institutt (NGI) and Vassdrags- and Havnelaboratoriet (VHL) which performed 
consultancy analysis linked to construction works. (Gulowsen 2000) 
 
A core part of R&D strategy for small scale decentralized industry was public support for 
the diffusion of science-based knowledge or technology. In particular the primary 
industries (fishing, seafood, agriculture, forestry) had long-established systems for 
collective research and for diffusion through education, consultancy organisations, 
seminars and conferences, training programmes etc. The Marine Research Institute and 
the higher education institutions and agricultural research institutes played a core role in 
linking industry to science and research. Nevertheless, science and technology played a 
modest role in technological and economic dynamics of these industries.  Instead, capital-
goods suppliers, importing agencies, and consultancies constituted the main aspects of   13
the knowledge infrastructure. Except for primary industries, the contributions of public 
support for R&D in the small-scale decentralised sector remained marginal until the 
1980s. 
 
Path creation: R&D-intensive, network-based industries 
The new industrial policy instruments of the 1960s became closely linked to R&D–
intensive, network-based industries (see Wicken 2007 description of this sector). An 
increasing share of public R&D funding controlled by the research council, the 
Development Fund, and the Public R&D contracts was allocated to areas later defined as 
ICT during and after the 1960s. Many of the selected national champions were companies 
from this sector. Simrad, the major producer of maritime electronics, received significant 
funding through all of the programs established to support R&D in industrial companies. 
Norsk Data, Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk and Noratom-Norcontrol also received funding 
from these sources. The emerging ICT technology became a central focus of Norwegian 
industrial research policy, and significant resources were used to support the development 
of high-tech companies. The state also invested substantial resources in a public research 
infrastructure, developing research institutes and university research directed towards this 
industry, and expanding education in the area. The research-driven strategy to build up a 
new path of R&D intensive companies became the core of Norwegian industrial R&D 
policy from the mid 1960s. (Wicken 2000) 
 
 
   14
The role of defence in industrial research strategy 
The emergence of this strategy in Norwegian policy was closely linked to the 
international defence challenges of the late 1950s. The Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI) had since its establishment in 1946 collaborated closely with British 
and American authorities.  The new emphasis on science and technology in Western 
defence put FFI in a central position in the transfer of knowledge from the USA and led 
to expanded financial support from the USA and NATO.  National defence also provided 
a strong argument for building up Norwegian national research capabilities. During the 
1960s FFI and the affiliated Institute for Nuclear Energy Research became the largest 
research institute in Norway.  FFI became closely liked to the NATO and American 
defence research communities, and the institute developed technologies important for the 
new arms race, including sub-sea detection systems for submarines, long range 
telecommunication, fire control systems, electronic intelligence, etc. The main 
representative of the new approach of the FFI was Finn Lied who became director of FFI 
in 1957 and remained in this position until 1982. (Njølstad and Wicken 1997) 
 
NATO defence policy in the late 1950s sought to build up a scientific basis for defence 
related issues and to build up an independent defence industry in Western Europe. 
Norway had a very limited defence industry during the 1950s, consisting mainly of three 
state-owned companies (one for shipbuilding, one for ammunition, and one for general 
weapons production). The defence minister of the first post-WWII governments, Jens 
Chr. Hauge, supported the modernisation of the defence companies with NATO funding. 
A powerful member of the board of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk (KV), Hauge argued in   15
favour of turning the old workshop into a modern high-tech defence company, and in 
1957, appointed Bjarne Hurlen as a director of the company. (Wicken 1987a) Hurlen and 
Hauge remained the key managers of KV until 1986, and Lied was on the KV board for 
most of this period. Finn Lied became the main industrial policy strategist in Labour from 
the 1960s to the 1980s. Together these three representatives of the Norwegian industrial-
technological system became strong proponents of science-based industrial policy. 
(Wicken 1994) The group connected to FFI and KV became core players in the 
introduction of the ideology ‘technology as the driving force’ in society and politics. 
 
A technology-driven system for defence industry development was established during the 
mid-1960s. The core organisations were FFI and KV, and they succeeded in getting 
support from the Ministry of Defence (FFI’s owner) and the Ministry of Industry (KV’s 
owner). In late 1950s, FFI began to receive substantial financial support from the USA 
for the development of a ship-to-submarine missile system (Terne III) and long-distance 
detection systems for submarines (Bridge). The missile system was produced by KV and 
the Ministry of Defence became the sales organisation for the system within NATO. The 
increased defence investment budget created new opportunities for national production of 
defence equipment. The largest investment was the construction of a modern navy 
(Flåteplanen 1963), a plan that for the first time involved Norwegian companies in large-
scale sales to Norwegian defence forces. Hauge, Lied and Hurlen turned KV into an 
instrument for industrial policy, arguing that the company should improve its product and 
production technologies, and diffuse the resulting ideas and practices to other parts of the 
economy. (Wicken 1984, 1987) For a quarter of a century KV took on production of   16
technologies that had been developed in Norwegian research institutes, most frequently in 
FFI. The technologies included computers, numerical control machinery, fire control 
systems, gas turbines, and weapons systems (the Penguin), as well as sub sea equipment 
and other products. (Njølstad and Wicken 1997, Wicken 1988) 
 
FFI and KV became leaders within Norway in defining a new type of production where 
science and research played a core role for success. To a large extent the processes of 
establishing a defence industry from the early 1960s created a path for policymaking and 
direction of this type of industry that remained influential in the following decades. 
Hauge-Hurlen-Lied represented a tradition in social democracy in supporting the 
importance of state-owned production units and public control of core knowledge bases. 
They tried to monopolise Norway’s emerging high-tech industrialisation by making KV 
the core player in technology-driven or research-driven industrialisation.
15   
 
The alliance between FFI and KV influenced a wider policy system supporting a science- 
and technology-driven policy strategy. FFI established in 1960 a Systems Group 
introducing systems evaluation techniques for assessing new technologies, a type of 
analysis introduced by the RAND organisation in the USA a few years earlier. Systems 
analysis became an instrument for planning future investments and measuring the 
efficiency and performance of different types of technologies and weapons systems. 
(Njølstad and Wicken 1997). Its reliance on systems analysis helped FFI to become an 
important instrument for defence planning. In 1963 Jens Chr. Hauge chaired a committee 
planning a re-organisation of national defence. In the committee served also Finn Lied   17
(director of FFI) and Håkon Kyllingmark (from 1965 minister of transport and 
telecommunications). The report argued that the Chief of Defence should have two equal 
advisory systems, one focused on military issues and the other on scientific and technical 
concerns. The committee recommended that FFI should be responsible for the latter 
advisory role, and should apply its scientific and technological expertise to decision 
making processes in defence (Njølstad & Wicken 1997) The idea that all aspects of 
policymaking should be based on scientific and technological expertise was incorporated 
into Labour’s political programme for the 1965 election, based on recommendations from 
a planning committee headed by Jens Chr. Hauge and with Finn Lied as a member. But 
Labour lost the election, forcing the party out of government for the first time since 1935, 
and the science based policy making system was not introduced. 
  
Lied and his colleagues were more successful in influencing strategic planning in the 
technical-industrial research council (NTNF) . Lied was at this time a member of NTNF’s 
executive board and therefore a  member of the group that during 1963-4 undertook  an 
evaluation of NTNF. The ministry of industry intervened and demanded that three more 
persons should be part of the evaluation committee. Two of them were Jens Chr. Hauge 
and Bjarne Hurlen. The military-industrial system (Wicken 1990) thus had a lot of 
influence on the emerging R&D industrial policy.  
 
A research driven strategy 
The 1964 NTNF evaluation report argued that Norway’s future welfare could not depend 
solely on resource-based industries. To ensure continued growth and improved welfare,   18
Norway had to develop new industries based on new technologies, and R&D played a 
crucial role in such a strategy. This argument was consistent with the thinking of the 
representatives of the military-technological system that emerged in the late 1950s, and it 
soon became widely accepted by scientists and research engineers in Norwegian 
universities and research institutes. The ideology positioned this social group and their 
knowledge as core agents for a wider modernisation of society and in the future welfare 
of the nation.  
 
Norway lacked research-based industries and had very few R&D-intensive companies in 
1963. The main exceptions to this characterization were firms with strong historical links 
with defence activities. Simrad was started by Willy Simonsen, who used his experience 
in UK defence laboratories during WWII to set up a company producing walkie-talkies 
and later, sub-sea detection technology for fisheries and shipping. (Sogner 1997) Nera 
started producing radiolink systems that also were based on know-how from British war 
laboratories, and marketed its products to NATO forces. (Njølstad and Wicken 1997) 
There was also a small company directed towards marketing technology for nuclear 
energy market (Noratom), but other than these firms, research-based industry in Norway 
was almost nonexistent.  
 
Beginning in 1964/65, Norwegian industrial R&D policy promoted this type of 
production, and the FFI-KV alliance was a core part of the strategy. The state-owned 
production company KV became the major engineering company and the national 
commercialisation company for products developed by researchers and scientists.    19
However, the Norwegian military resisted pressure from the FFI-KV interests to define 
the weapons systems and technologies that the military should choose,
 often preferring to 
procure systems and technologies from abroad, rather than getting involved in local 
development projects. (Wicken 1987) To overcome this resistance from the military users 
of domestically developed products, the Ministry of Defence (headed by the industrialist 
Grieg Tiedemand) developed regulations for procurement practices in the defence system 
that forced the military procurement agencies to consider the industrial implications for 
Norway of their investment programmes.  The nonsocialist government supported the 
introduction of a subsidy system for public R&D contracts that encouraged public users 
to pursue development projects with Norwegian industry. The system for public R&D 
contracts became in many ways an instrument for the promotion of high-tech or research-
based industrialization, especially for the ICT industry. Almost all contracts went to 
companies in this sector. (Wicken 2000) 
 
The industrial research council, NTNF, also became a strong promoter of 
industrialization based on emerging technologies such as electronics, computers and 
telecommunication (ICT). NTNF allocated a growing share of its budget towards these 
technologies, and the research council established large projects that involved the newly 
established companies of the research-driven path as well as older companies that were 
national champions. The automation-computing committee became a particularly strong 
supporter of research-based industry, and companies like the mini computer producer 
ND, the defence system provider Kongsberg, the automation company Norcontrol and 
the maritime electronics company Simrad were the primary recipients of NTNF funding   20
in this area. The public support system also supported the entry of national champions 
like Aker (numerically controlled machinery and semiconductors) and Hydro (ship 
automation) into publicly funded automation research projects. (Wicken 2000) 
 
Not all supporters of a research or technology driven strategy for industrialisation 
supported the strong role of defence, especially the strong role of Hauge, Hurlen and 
Lied, and two controversies erupted in 1967. A group of researchers at FFI had developed 
a prototype of a minicomputer and wanted to leave FFI to set up a private company to 
produce computers commercially. Lied objected and transferred the prototype to KV for 
production. The young researchers challenged Lied with support from within FFI and 
from NTNF, and their departure from FFI created the basis for the establishment of 
Norsk Data, a symbol of research-based industrialisation and an alternative to the state-
driven strategy of KV-FFI. A similar development took place in 1967 within 
telecommunications research. FFI initiated the establishment of a national research 
laboratory for telecommunications (TF), supported by the Minister of Transport and 
Telecommunications Håkon Kyllingmark.
16  But the director of TF, Nic Knudtzon, did 
not support the state-driven strategy of FFI-KV, and TF chose to collaborate with both 
national (Nera) and international companies (EB controlled by Ericsson and STK 
controlled by ITT).
17 (Collett and Lossius 1986) 
 
The establishment of industrial instruments for R&D during the 1960s was closely 
connected to political support to specific types of industrialization. Most of the system 
was introduced to promote research-driven or R&D-intensive industrialization as part of   21
a wider ideology of support for research and new technologies in social and economic 
development that was influential in Western policymaking at the time. The research 
council, the public R&D contracts, the buildup of KV as a commercialization company, 
the development of a telecommunications R&D system, and other instruments supported 
a research-driven industrial strategy. Norway’s strategy was similar to those of other 
European economies, but the military-technology system shaped the structure of the 
support system to an unusual degree. KV-FFI, under the supervision of Hauge-Lied-
Hurlen shaped how the policy systems functioned, emphasizing state or national 
ownership and control. Over time, however, parts of the public support system broke 
away from this ideology and promoted a more liberal strategy based on private ownership 
of companies.  
 
By the late 1970s, a substantial policy structure had been established to promote the 
emergence of a new path of Norwegian economic development that relied on R&D–
intensive, network-based companies. A significant number of new companies had been 
established and some of the old companies had entered high-tech industries. The main 
companies were Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, Norsk Data (computers), Simrad (marine 
electronics), Norcontrol (automation systems), and AME (semi conductors). By this time 
Norway had a large number of small high-tech companies, and some observers found 
Norway to be the most dynamic of the Nordic countries.  
 
These emerging industries were supported by a substantial knowledge infrastructure. In 
addition to the national industrial research council (NTNF), both the defense sector (FFI)   22
and the telecommunication sector (TF) purchased research services from companies, 
research institutes, and universities. A significant research base within ICT developed 
and many research institutes expanded their capacity and competence within this area. 
FFI, TF, IFA, CMI, Sintef (for example Elab), SI, Norsk Regnesentral, and others 
developed wide competences in regulation technology, communication, computing, 
semiconductors, etc.  
 
Public procurement also promoted R&D in companies through public R&D contracts 
between a companies and public agencies. This type of arrangement was particularly 
linked to emerging technologies, and mostly to ICT. This connected company R&D to 
market demand, and to large public users. The most frequent users of public R&D 
contracts for high tech industries were the defense and the telecommunication sectors. 
 
Research driven re-industrialisation strategy (c.1978 – 1990)  
During the 1980s the research-driven industrial policy reached its peak. The renewed 
interest in this type of industrial policy was reflected in a 1978 report by a committee 
headed by Finn Lied that presented ideas for a new industrial policy. (NOU 1978). This 
document followed up some of the ideas from the 1960s, emphasising the role of 
emerging technologies for future industrial development. The ideas had by this time been 
widely circulated in international analyses of the economic recession of the 1970s. There 
were two main interpretations of the wider change in international economy during the 
1970s. One interpretation was that the economy had entered a radical transformation 
from industrial to post-industrial society. (Bell 1976) Another group of scholars argued   23
that we were in the middle of a new Industrial Revolution  characterized by the 
emergence of new growth sectors based on  radical technological innovation. (Mensch 
1979, Freeman & Soete 1982) 
 
Interpreting the socioeconomic changes of the 1970s as a Third Industrial Revolution 
suggested the possibility of re-industrialisation, based on emerging technologies that 
could become the basis for the next long-term growth period. In the terminology used in 
Wicken (2007), the policy was a strategy for an industrial path creation process. Modern 
economies moved away from the old manufacturing sectors to new ‘high tech’ industries. 
Future growth was dependent on a successful transformation of the economy that relied 
on the growth of new sectors based on new technologies. 
 
The role of new technologies in the re-industrialisation process made R&D a core 
element in the emerging policy. Technological development was regarded as closely 
linked to science, research, and development – concepts that in policy-making became 
incorporated into the R&D concept. There was a strong belief that what was later labelled 
as information and communication technologies (ICT at the time involved different 
technologies like telecommunication, computers, control technology and professional 
electronics ) would play a decisive role in the transformation of the economy, and 
therefore was important to long term economic growth and welfare. In short, Europe 
should put resources into the development of ICT and create strong industrial sectors 
within this group of technologies.  
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In many ways this re-industrialisation strategy based on new technologies and investment 
in R&D resembled the ideas of the Norwegian modernisers of the 1960s. There was, 
however, a major change in the political context that influenced the conditions under 
which new industries could be established in the 1980s and contrasted with the 1960s. 
Although Hauge-Lied-Hurlen had proposed a state-driven policy during the 1960s, the 
Lied committee in 1978 argued that the international context had changed significantly, 
making a more liberal policy necessary for a research-driven industrial strategy. The 
more liberal views were supported in a 1981 policy paper on national R&D policy (NOU 
30: 1981) that advocated a liberalisation of the research system in order to improve 
interaction between the large industrial research institute sector and companies, and to 
increase industrial R&D. With the support of nonsocialist governments during 1981-1986 
(Willoch I and II), Norway adopted a more liberal industrial ideology.  
 
Industrial R&D benefited during the 1980s from increased public spending. During 1983 
- 1993, public R&D spending increased from 5500 to 9000 mill. NOK in fixed (2000) 
prices, i.e. more than 80 per cent. The growth in public R&D during the second half of 
the 1980s was linked to the decision of the Brundtland government to increase public 
R&D by five per cent as part of the Technology Targeted Area (TTA) policy. (St.prp. 1, 
1986-87) The TTA strategy was a technology- and R&D-driven policy in which the main 
instrument to promote new industries was R&D, and a substantial part of the funding 
increase was linked to industrial R&D.
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Implementing a research-driven re-industrialization strategy 
Like its predecessors during the postwar period, the new Norwegian policy was part of a 
wider international trend in industrial policymaking. During the mid-1980s, many OECD 
countries introduced programs that were similar to the Targeted Technology Area (TTA) 
policy, based on the idea that governments should select potential growth sectors and 
move resources to these industries. The main areas selected by European countries were 
linked to emerging technologies like IT, biotechnology and new materials. The 
background for the re-industrialisation strategy in Europe was rapid de-industrialisation 
(reduction in manufacturing-industry employment) during the 1970s. In contrast to much 
of Western Europe, however, Norway experienced declines in employment in 
manufacturing industries somewhat later, in the late 1970s. 
 
The policy of a research-driven industrial strategy during the 1980s achieved wide 
political support from both the nonsocialist governments (Willoch I and II 1981-86, Syse 
1989) and the Labour government (Brundtland I, 1986-1989). New technologies and 
research had achieved a dominant ideological position in industrial policy making that 
they have had before or since. This wider political consensus supported public industrial 
R&D funding and made R&D the core element of industrial policy. All governments 
during the 1980s planned and implemented a research-driven industrial strategy, 
concentrating national R&D resources on specific sectors and technologies. The Ministry 
of Industry started to plan the strategy in 1982 and presented a plan for expanding 
industrial public R&D funding in 1984. The plan suggested that industrial policy should 
give priority to the three new technology areas that internationally were accepted as   26
important; information technology (IT), biotechnology, new materials. However, the 
government also decided that Norway should support the development of two industries 
which were nation specific: fish farming and offshore technology.
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This policy framework reflected the existing economic realities in Norway, and also the 
influence of various types of industry in the political system. Expanded support for 
emerging technologies was well received in large parts of the research communities and 
in Norway’s small but rapidly expanding high tech industry. The government wanted to 
strengthen the development of a R&D-intensive, network-based industry as a new 
dynamic element in the economy. But the older sectors of the economy remained 
influential, and developments during the 1980s proved that opportunities for new 
industries based on natural resources were significant. The highly technical offshore 
sector represented opportunities for industrial growth within the large-scale centralised 
path, while the emerging fish farming sector represented the long tradition of the small-
scale decentralised form of industrialisation. All the main paths of Norway’s economic 
development were represented in the new policy; and no type of industrialisation was 
excluded.  
 
Re-industrialisation strategy for small-scale industry: fish farming  
Systematic experiments in farming of salmon and trout had started during the 1970s and 
by the 1980s, this sector was regarded as a potentially important small-scale industry that 
could be incorporated in the existing local economies along the coast. The development 
of the new industry was closely linked to the traditional fishing sector. Most of the   27
involved actors came from fisheries, both regarding capital, technology, and knowledge. 
The technology of using nets for growing fish was an extension of methods used to catch 
and keep fish alive for shorter period of time. Most of the fish farmers had backgrounds 
in the coastal or ocean fisheries, and most innovations were the outcome of close 
interaction between local fish farmers, mechanical workshops, banks and other 
knowledge sources. (Berge 2006)  
 
Research played a marginal role in the early developments of the new industry, but some 
scientists were interested in the new field and started up research projects. Projects linked 
to biology and medicine (fish health, diseases) were established in research communities 
traditionally linked to agriculture and fisheries. When a political plan for the emerging 
industry was discussed 1972-77, research was regarded as a servant, support function or 
problem solver for the industry. (Mariussen 1992)  
 
During the early 1980s the role of R&D in fish farming policy changed. The ideological 
change was initiated at the industrial research council; NTNF. Fish farming now became 
redefined from small scale local production of salmon and trout to the basis for 
establishing industrial food production in the ocean. The industry was redefined from 
aquaculture to mariculture (havbruk), the concept used in American documents with 
similar ideas in the 1970s.
20 The scientific and research communities promoted this 
interpretation of fish farming, and in a short period of time the industry was redefined as 
a future potential growth sector and a targeted technology area.  
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As part of this process the industry became part of a controversy of definition. Was ‘fish 
farming’ to be regarded as fishing, farming or manufacturing industry? Three ministries 
and three research councils competed to control the development of the new industry. In 
addition to the industrial research council, NTNF, there was also a research council for 
agriculture (NLFR) and one for fishing (NFFR). This created a diverse system for 
funding of fish-farming research. Researchers could apply for resources from multiple 
sources, and fish farming became the second largest of the targeted technology areas of 
the 1980s.  
 
Competition among the three research councils for control of the emerging industry 
produced rapid growth in public R&D funding. In 1973 research relevant for fish farming 
had a cost of c. 1,5 million NOK. In 1984 the three research councils alone supported 
R&D for fish farming for 17 million NOK, and this increased to 31 million in the 
following year. In 1988 they financed research for 75 million NOK, and in the period 
1988-1992 the average funding for R&D for fish farming was c. 125 million NOK. 
(Mariussen 1992) 
 
During this period also some large companies became involved in research-driven fish 
farming (Aslesen 2007). The most important actor during the 1980s was Norsk Hydro 
which had decided to pursue a research-driven diversification strategy that relied on R&D 
to establish future productions sectors. This strategy was the company’s parallel to the 
national TTA policy, and Norsk Hydro selected biotechnology, fish farming, and new   29
materials as their main areas. (Andersen & Yttri 1997) Hydro established R&D strategies 
and organizations for fish farming, and became a driving force for research in the area.  
 
By the late 1980s fish farming had been defined as the future basis for food production 
and therefore a potential growth industry. Political documents argued that success in the 
sector depended on R&D, and public investment in R&D a view that was also reflected in 
some of the major industrial companies. The research-driven strategy had become a basis 
for the establishment of a new small scale coastal industry. However, the belief in 
research-driven innovation in fish farming did not last long. By the early 1990s, Norsk 
Hydro had abandoned its research-based diversification strategy and had reduced its 
involvement in fish farming. When the industry experienced a downturn during the early 
1990s, skepticism grew concerning the role of research in the future development of the 
industry. The evaluation of the TTA of fish farming argues that public funding of 
research was reduced because politicians no longer believed in a research-driven strategy 
for industrialization – at least not for this type of industry (Mariussen 1992:12) Research 
once more was reduced to being the servant of industry. 
 
Re-industrialisation strategy for R&D intensive industries: IT 
Information technology (IT) was a core technology in research-driven industrialization. 
This area received by far the largest public subsidies, and a large share of Norway’s 
public R&D funding was directed towards this group of technologies. This is also 
reflected in the funding of the research council, NTNF. Among technological fields, IT 
received by far the largest share of NTNF funding during the latter part of the 1980s,   30
accounting for more than 50% of total funding allocated to targeted areas, and the 
sector’s share was especially high during 1986-88. (NHD 1990)  
 
Policymakers’ optimism over the prospects for this emerging technology was linked to 
the IT sector’s rapid growth and the economic success of a number of Norwegian 
companies. Two of these high-tech companies became symbols of the Norwegian re-
industrialization process of the 1980s. Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk (KV) became one of the 
country’s largest manufacturing companies and a leading high-tech company dominated 
by engineers and people with advanced degrees in technical fields. KV became a symbol 
of Labour’s strategy through the 1970s of developing new industries with state ownership 
and control. Norsk Data (ND) also grew rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, and was by 
the mid 1980s a leading European producer and exporter of minicomputers. As a private 
company registered on the stock exchange in both Oslo and New York it symbolized the 
entrepreneurial opportunities of the more liberal economy of the 1980s. A large number 
of other Norwegian ICT companies also enjoyed substantial growth until 1987. (see 
Sogner 2007) 
 
During the 1980s, the system of public R&D funding for companies favoured a select 
group of national champions. The tendency to concentrate R&D resources among a few 
selected companies is apparent in the statistics on NTNF funding of companies’ R&D 
during the research driven industrial strategy. Between 1978 and 1987 NTNF distributed 
50 per cent of its total funding for corporate R&D to just 13 companies (figure 2). 
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[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As was noted earlier, the ICT industry itself received more than 50 per cent of the total 
funding for corporate R&D from NTNF during the 1980s, with particularly strong 
position for this industry during 1987-88 [redundant with earlier statement]. The five 
largest projects in NTNF’s corporate programme during the 1980s were all in the IT 
sector: 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It is not surprising that Norsk Data (ND) achieved a strong position in the Norwegian 
R&D support system. Along with KV, the company was the main national champion in 
the ICT sector, receiving substantial funding from public R&D institutions during the 
1980s in addition to indirect subsidies through high prices on computer systems sold to 
public administration and other public organisations. The company enjoyed strong 
support in political institutions and in procurement agencies, and until the late 1980s had 
a near-monopoly on computer sales to public sector. The other main national champion, 
KV, received annual operating subsidies from the government to cover its financial 
deficits, a signal of the continuing strength of the military-technology system within 
Norway in the 1980s.  
 
NTNF’s strong support for Autodisplay signifies the dominant ideology of the 1980s. 
The project was based on a plan by an entrepreneur with visions of a future technology 
that would result in large-scale growth, and was organized by a company established in   32
1985 to develop a new intelligent automobile instrument panel that would collect a large 
amount of data for the car driver. The plan called for the establishment of a large plant in 
Sandefjord in 1991 in collaboration with an Italian producer of car instrumentation that 
could make Norway a more important player in the European and international car 
industry. It was the largest project ever supported by the research council, and was also 
part of the Eureka project Prometheus. It failed and production never started.  
 
Other projects, including SensoNor, Norcontrol and Dolphin, were based on proposals for 
new technologies that would support the establishment of substantial new industries. This 
ideology was strong in Norway during the 1980s, based on the success of Norsk Data. 
ND’s development illustrated the opportunities created by the emerging technologies. 
Even in small countries entrepreneurs could establish new companies with substantial 
growth potential.  
 
The belief that IT research projects could develop new technologies that would form the 
basis for long term growth of new or old companies was the main driving force the 
attempt to use public R&D to create a new industrial path in the economy.
21 This 
ideology dominated NTNF and was the basis for the strategies for defense-related R&D   
(FFI) and the telecommunication R&D (TF).  In addition, most public R&D contracts 
remained directed towards IT projects. The emerging technologies achieved strong 
political support from governments and from industrial associations and the large 
industrial companies.  
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In spite of this ideology and support policy for R&D intensive industrialisation, the most 
important influence on high-tech industrial development in Norway during the 1980s was 
the growth of offshore oil and gas production. Beginning in the late 1980s, Norwegian 
policy mandated the creation of links between international oil companies and national 
R&D organisations. This policy strongly shaped the direction of the IT/ICT industry. 
 
Re-industrialisation strategy for large scale technologies: R&D in offshore sector  
The development of a petroleum sector in Norwegian economy was not based on the idea 
of a research-driven industrial expansion. Here, production came first, and strategies for 
R&D followed only when the industry was well established. The introduction of R&D as 
part of oil policy emerged at the end of the 1970s.
22 The new policy was introduced in 
1978 when the government introduced the Technology Agreements.
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The new policy embodied in the Technology Agreements was based on the Norwegian 
government’s power to hand out or deny concessions for permission to drill for oil and 
gas on the Norwegian shelf. (see Engen 2007) The government developed a system of 
criteria to guide the granting of concessions to applicants, and an important criterion 
established in 1978 was investment by foreign oil companies in R&D in the Norwegian 
economy.  The Goodwill Agreements involved R&D contracts between oil companies 
and Norwegian companies, universities and research institutes. (Wiig 1993)  Along with 
public R&D contracts, the Goodwill Agreements were important elements in a shift in 
policy during 1978-93 to make R&D more market-oriented and for science to become 
more involved with technological problems of industry.   34
The Goodwill Agreements (GWA) became very influential instruments in increasing 
industrial R&D. Oil companies paid around 80 per cent tax on the revenues from the 
North Sea, and the companies’ investment in Norwegian research was therefore indirectly 
paid for by the state. The oil companies’ collaboration with Norwegian companies and 
research institutes had a great impact on the research system. Companies and research 
institutes turned towards the demand (and profit) in the offshore sector, as is apparent 
from R&D spending data. The oil and gas sector rapidly increased its procurement of 
R&D from external sources, and reached a volume of 700-800 million NOK during the 
first half of the 1980s. By comparison, all manufacturing industry procured R&D services 
from external organisations for c. 250-450 mill NOK. (Statistics Norway) The surge in 
demand for R&D from the oil and gas sector had a crowding-out effect, as the expansion 
in petroleum related R&D corresponded with a period of reduction of industrial R&D. 
(Smith and Wicken 1991) The GWA strongly influenced industrial R&D in the longer 
term as well, as oil companies reported that they invested 5.800 million (1990 NOK) 
NOK through approximately 1500 different projects during 1979-91.  
 
The rapid increase in procurement of R&D services in the offshore sector that began in 
the late 1970s influenced the development of universities, research institutes, and much 
of Norway’s emergent high-technology industrial sector, especially in ICT. Norway’s 
ICT industry found a lucrative market for technology development in the large oil and 
gas sector, and a substantial part became incorporated as problem-solvers into the large 
technological system developing in the North Sea. 
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The demand for R&D from the offshore sector was introduced just a few years before a 
more market-oriented policy was introduced for the research institutes. The new policy 
mandated that institutes should become independent organisations and receive a part of 
their income as basic funding from the research council. Most of the remainder of their 
income should come from projects from private and public sector. The new policy 
encouraged research institutes to seek new markets for their services in, for example, the 
offshore sector. Three institutes became closely linked to strategy of the Oil Directorate 
(OD) (which became a new de facto “research council”): Rogalandsforskning in 
Stavanger, Institute for Energy Technology at Kjeller outside Oslo, and Sintef in 
Trondheim.  These institutes, and SINTEF in particular, became closely incorporated in 
the ministry’s and directorate’s   strategy   which focused on increasing revenues from 
the oil fields. . The most important part of the programme was to improve knowledge 
regarding flows of gas and oil in pipes, and how to increase the percentage of the 
reservoir that could be exploited.
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The R&D strategy introduced through the Technology Agreement policy between 1978 
and 1993 heavily influenced the development of the Norwegian R&D system. It directed 
large parts of Norway’s national research and knowledge infrastructure towards the large 
and profitable domestic market, strengthening a Norwegian development trajectory (see 
Engen 2007) with specific knowledge demands and characteristics.    36
 
The breakdown of the research driven industrial strategy 
The hegemony of the research-driven strategy in public industrial policy broke down 
during the early 1990s. The change in political thinking took place inside the Labour 
government of Gro Harlem Brundtland as she became prime minister for the third time in 
1990. The ‘research-driven strategy’ for industrialisation was abandoned in favour of a 
‘user-driven strategy’ for industrial research and development. Existing industry became 
far more influential in industrial R&D policy making, and representatives of R&D-
intensive, network-based industries became less influential.   
 
The breakdown of the research-driven strategy resulted from changes in different parts of 
industry during the economic crises of 1987-93, as well as learning from the experience 
of the policy instruments introduced during the late 1980s. The evaluations that were 
undertaken of the “Targeted Technology Areas” were rather critical to the 
implementation of that policy, particularly the lack of  good instruments for realizing the 
objectives,   and this obviously made a strategic policy change politically feasible. 
However, the main factor behind the breakdown of the research-driven industrialisation 
strategy was the difference in development among the three main layers of the innovation 
system. (See Wicken 2007) In particular there was a change in the relative political 
influence of the large scale centralized and R&D intensive network industry sectors 
between 1986 and 1993, and this strongly influenced policymakers’ thinking about future 
growth opportunities.  
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The most important factor in the breakdown of the research-driven strategy was the 
severe problems experienced by the R&D-intensive industries during 1987-88. The two 
major national champions in ICT entered into economic crises, and Norsk Data went 
bankrupt. This was a shock to many as ND had been the model company in the research-
driven industrial strategy of the 1980s. In a surprisingly short period of time, the vast 
network of organisations and individuals around ND disintegrated and very little of the 
computer industry survived. Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk (KV) had lost money almost every 
year since the beginning of the 1970s, and the Labour government (Brundtland 2, 1986-
89) finally broke with the core group of modernisers from the 1960s. Hauge-Hurlen-Lied 
lost control of KV, and the company became involved in an international scandal over the 
use of KV technology to produce silent propellers for strategic Soviet submarines.
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(Wicken 1988) KV was divided into a number of companies and privatised; only the 
defence part of KV remained state-owned. The KV privatization symbolized a shift in 
Labour policies towards a more market-oriented industrial strategy, and a clear signal that 
the KV model for research-driven industrialisation was no longer viable. The weakening 
of the network around KV and the breakdown of the network around ND weakened the 
position of  R&D-intensive industry in Norwegian politics. When the national 
telecommunications industry collapsed in the early 1990s, (see Sogner 2007) the ideology 
that future industrial growth would come from public support for R&D in emerging 
technologies lost support, and the research-based industries became a much weaker 
player in the political system. 
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In this critical period of collapse in several emerging industries, Norway had an 
alternative potential industrial strategy. The offshore oil and gas sector had been selected 
as a major growth industry in the 1970s and was subsequently selected as a targeted 
technology area. The fall in petroleum prices in 1986 created uncertainty over the future 
profitability of the industry, but by around1990 the industry was again profitable and 
crucial for state income. The state-controlled companies Stat oil and Hydro, the strong 
engineering companies (Kuærher and Aker), supply industries, and other parts of the 
large scale technological system of the oil industry became the focus of policy. The 
strong position of the offshore oil and gas sector effectively displaced the research-driven 
strategy that had been directed towards emerging technologies. Public policy followed 
the change in the strategies of the largest resource-based companies. Norsk Hydro 
abandoned its R&D-driven diversification strategy, focusing instead after 1990 on 
improving production in ‘core activities.’ Norsk Hydro focused on three sectors; 
fertilizers, aluminium and oil/gas, and R&D related to other product areas decreased. The 
government followed suit, focusing on the same ‘core activities’. Norsk Hydro, Statoil 
and a few others became the new ‘national champions’. Within this industrial policy, 
R&D was no longer a source of economic transformation, and public R&D spending 
instead supported problem-solving activities in existing production systems. 
 
The offshore oil and gas sector had by 1990 become a major part of Norway’s economy. 
It shaped politicians’ policy debates, as well as the behaviour of   R&D   performing  
organisations and other sectors of the economy. The ability of the oil and gas sector to 
attract attention away from the research-driven strategy is illustrated by the careers of the   39
promoters of the research-based strategy of the 1960s. Beginning in the early 1970s, Jens 
Chr. Hauge and Finn Lied turned their political interest towards the emerging offshore 
sector, emphasising institution building for a state-owned and nationally controlled 
system for exploiting the new natural resource. Hauge became the first chairman of the 
core political instrument, Statoil, and Lied soon followed him as the chair of the board. 
(Hanisch & Nerheim 1992) In a similar way the political system from the first half of the 
1990s chose to focus on the resource based industries. There was less political interest in 
industrial R&D in general and in research-driven strategies in particular. (see 
Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum 2007) 
 
The build-up of the large technological system around offshore production also attracted 
large parts of Norwegian industry seeking to exploit this lucrative market. Norway’s 
industrial policy for the offshore sector ( Engen 2007) and the large scale of investment 
in the sector influenced the development of the Norwegian  R&D infrastructure, the 
structure of Norwegian manufacturing industry, and some parts of the Norwegian service 
sector. The sectors of Norway’s economy that supplied offshore production activities 
grew to constitute a significant part of the economy, a reality that influenced the 
behaviour of companies and policymakers. Norway’s industrial R&D strategy became 
focused on the problems of the resource-based industries, particularly oil and gas. The 
large investments in the offshore sector during the early 1990s drew research institutes, 
universities and R&D-intensive companies into deeper involvement in Norway’s oil 
economy. In this economy R&D intensive-industry was only one (of many) support   40
industries for the resource based industry. The R&D driven strategy for industrialisation 
based on emerging industries had come to an end. 
 
The breakdown of the research intensive strategy for industrialisation created a path for 
Norway’s industrial R&D investment and innovation system that contrasted with those of 
neighbouring economies such as Sweden and Finland. In these countries the R&D-
intensive industries remained success stories (or were strong enough to survive), and the 
national policies remained focused on research-driven industrial strategies directed 
towards R&D-intensive industries like ICT, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, and 
biotechnology. Sweden and Finland stand out internationally as very R&D-intensive 
economies. Norway focused on developing resource-based industries in which R&D is 
not the sole driving force, but instead supports industry performance, acting as a servant 
in solving problems in large technological systems or as part of wider knowledge flows in 
the economy. One result of this trajectory of development is the persistently lower level 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 At the Labour Party's 1963 annual conference, Wilson made possibly his best-remembered speech, on the 
implications of scientific and technological change, in which he argued that "the Britain that is going to be 
forged in the white heat of this revolution will be no place for restrictive practices or for outdated measures 
on either side of industry". 
 
2 S. Zuckerman ”Linking science with industrial growth”; Financial Times 7.11 
 
3 OECD published the first report on science policy, the Piganiol report, in 1963 and organized the first 
ministerial meeting on Science Policy the same year. 
 
4 Cuttings in the archives of the Ministry of Industry from Financial Times 7.11 ”Government drive to 
modernise Britain” and 15.11., on “Getting ready to push research” and S. Zuckerman ”Linking science 
with industrial growth”; “Three new bodies should take over from DSIR”, NOE-RA, VI, Boks 59, Utvalg i 
forbindelse med opprettelse av et utviklingsselskap. 
 
5 The director of the research council (NTNF), Robert Major, played an important role in drawing the 
attention of OECD policymakers to R&D policy. The 1963 OECD analysis was probably ordered by NTNF 
in order to bring industrial research into the realm of industrial policy. (Interview Robert Major) 
 
6 The main policy making organisation within the ministry was the Negotiation Committee 
(Forhandlingsutvalget or Gøtheutvalget) headed by the statssekretær Odd Gøthe from 1955. This 
committee discussed new ideas for establishment of new industry and came up with proposals to be 
discussed by the government. Næringsdepartementet, Utredningsavd, VI, 40; Forhandlingsutvalget for nye 
industritiltak, Mappe 1 1955-6,6 Notat MM 29.11.63.  
 
7 NOE-RA, VI, Boks 59: Utvalg i forbindelse med opprettelse av et utviklingsselskap, April 1962: PM om 
et utviklingsfond 
 
8 This was the perception of the ministry of industry: ”NTNF is today primarily an advisory body for 
researchers, not for industry. The industrialists that participate in the NTNF do so in their private capacity 
and this does not guarantee close contact with industry” NOE, VI, Boks 59: Utvalg i forbindelse med 
opprettelse av et utviklingsselska7.3.64  
 
9 The Labour government intervened in the evaluation process and asked Hurlen, Hauge and also the 
representative of large scale industrialisation, nn, to be part of the evaluation committee. 
 
10 KV became this type of organisation between 1963 and 1987. 
 
11 Shipping and shipbuilding also played a central role in the strategy of NTNF. There was a build-up of the 
research infrastructure for these industries in Trondheim, and NTNF also assigned a high priority to this 
cluster when handing out R&D support to companies. The ship classification company, Det norske Veritas 
(DnV), was crucial in the strategy for developing technological competence within this part of the economy 
(Andersen and Collett 1989), and DnV alone received 17% of all money distributed from NTNF to 
companies during 1967-1977.  In addition companies like Aker, Moss Rosenberg Verft, Ankerløkken, 
Bergen Mek Verksted, Wickman motorfabrikk and Norcontrol all received substantial support.  
 
12 Byggforskningsinstituttet, Norsk Geoteknisk Institutt, Vassdrags- og havnelaboratoriet 
 
13 Skipsmodelltanken, Skipsteknisk Forskningsinstitutt, from 1972 Norges Skipsforskningsinstitutt 
 
14 Elektrisitetsforsyningens forskningsinstitutt 
   42
                                                                                                                                                 
15 With the exception of one year KV never made a surplus. Every year it received (substantial) subsidies 
from the ministry of industry. It was more a technology-industrial policy instrument than a ordinary 
industrial company (NOU 1988) 
 
16 Kyllingmark was closely linked to Defence, and was a former member of the Hauge committee which 
discussed the future management of the defence sector in 1964. 
 
17 The specific direction of Norway research-based policy strategy became evident in the 1970s when Jens 
Chr. Hauge made an attempt to reorganise the IT industry which had emerged from the mid 1960s. Hauge 
followed up the idea which was developed in the Development Fund, that policy should encourage 
development of strong and large organisations. (Sogner 1994) From the 1960s different companies had 
been defined as ‘key companies’ who should receive public R&D support, while others were more or less 
excluded from the subsidy system. Hauge’s effort failed and the research intensive industry remained small 
scale with a few exceptions, KV, ND and the two major international telecommunication, STK (ITT) and 
EB (Ericsson, Norwegian owners from 1974). 
 
18 This is based on NIFUSTEP Statistikkbanken for studies of R&D funding in the yearly state budget, 
defining the following categories as ‘industrial R&D’: primary industries, manufacturing, energy, 
transport- and telecommunication, space and defence. State funding in 1983 was 1189 mill NOK, 
increasing to 3034 mill NOK in 1993. In nominal prices the increase 1983 to 1993 was 155%. 
 
19 The targeted technology areas were introduced for the five years period 1986/87 to 1990/91. 
 
20 Project ‘Mari Culture’ by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Sea Grant Office 1970, 
publication J. Hanson (ed.), Open Sea Mariculture, Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross, 1972. Based on 
Mariussen 1992.  
 
21 Pharmaceutical industry was traditionally weak in Norway. However, during the 1980s the small 
company Nyco made a break through in radiocontrast agent production, becoming a leading international 
producer of the field. (Amdam and Sogner 1994) The company’s growth and profitability supported the 
idea that R&D could lead to new growth opportunities within research based industries. However, this 
sector was much weaker in Norwegian politics and science, and was not able to create the same type of 
support as that of the ICT sector. 
 
22 NTNF established a R&D programme for the emerging offshore sector during the 1970s, mainly directed 
towards development of production technology for the sector. It was part of the research council’s wider 
strategy for promoting industrial development. However, the programme was rather limited and not 
incorporated into a wider strategy for the development of the new industry.  
 
23 The TC consisted of three types of regulations called ‘50% agreement’, technology agreements, goodwill 
agreement. The latter represents 77% of all R&D funding of the system. Data on the Goodwill Agreements 
based on Wiig (1993). 
 
24 In the 1970s it was expected to harvest app 20 % of the total oil in the reservoir, while the percentage 
was app 50 at the turn of the century. 
 
25 KV exported  numerical control systems for machinery to Toshiba, and Toshiba re-exported the systems 
to the Soviet Union. This created the deepest crises in Norway’s relationship with USA since WWII. The 
government decided to get rid of the Kongsberg name and renamed the company to Norsk 
Forsvarsteknologi (Norwegian Defence Technologies)   43
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Table 1: The five largest projects in NTNF’s corporate programme during 
the 1980s 
 
Company Project  Details 
Autodisplay  Instruments for car industry  25 M NOK 
Norsk Data  Software  22 M NOK 
Dophin Server  Orion superserver  14 M NOK (the follow-up 
of ND) 
Sensonor  Integrated sensors (inl. Car 
industry) 
9 M NOK 
Norsk Data  Archival programmes  4 M NOK 
Norcontrol Simulation    2 M NOK 
(Source: NHD 1990: 106) 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of funding from Utviklingsfondet 
(Development Fund) 1965-1977 
 













Figure 1 shows cumulative distribution between companies receiving support from Uviklingsfondet for the 
period 1965-77. The figure shows that 60% of total number of companies received app 10% of total 
funding, while 24 companies received 50% of total funding. 
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Figure 2: R&D by funding, million NOK (fixed prices, 2000) 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of funds from NTNF (Nyskaping I 
næringslivet/Innovation in industry) 1978-1987  
 



































































The figure suggests that 13 companies received 50 per cent of total funding by NTNF 1978-1987 
 
 